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Introduction
Until recently most airports were owned and managed by public authorities.
Nonetheless, a growing number of airports in Europe as well as Australia and New Zealand became fully or partially privatized during the last twenty years.
Furthermore, many airports in South-America, Africa, and Asia are under review for being privatized [8] . Airport privatization is almost always accompanied by some form of price regulation. This is basically due to the fact that airports are supposed to exhibit market power. However, Starkie claims that there would be a lack of incentives for airports to exploit it [9] . His conclusion is based on demand complementarities between aeronautical and commercial airport activities in combination with location rents. Aeronautical activities of the airport include the provision of take-o, landing, and parking capacity for aircraft. Commercial activities include, e.g., retailing and car parking. Roughly outlined, Starkie argues that increased airport charges do not only reduce the demand for ights, but, also, the demand for commercial services. This in turn reduces location rents and therefore the returns to the tenant, i.e., the airport itself. Following this reasoning the airport might not want to raise aeronautical charges so that airport regulation might be unnecessary.
In reality there is no fully liberalized airport market in the world, and airport policy makers are basically considering modications of the regulatory regimes.
An example on which we will focus in this paper is given by the debate about the single-till and the dual-till approach. It addresses the problem of the`right' integration of aeronautical and commercial activities into airport price regulation. The single-till approach is characterized by an inclusion of commercial revenues into the price-cap formula. The dual-till approach, in contrast, tries to separate the aeronautical from the commercial activities, such that only the former ones determine the price-cap formula. In Australia, the United Kingdom, and Germany the question was raised whether price-cap regulation could be improved by switching from a single-till to a dual-till approach, see [2] , [3] , [7] , [4] .
Beesley was one of the rst economists to attack the single-till approach [1] .
He claims that regulation should concentrate on activities which are characterized by a natural monopoly, and therefore not be aected by the commercial activities. On the other hand, he doubts that it is possible to isolate the aeronautical activities from other airport activities. For this reason he generally rejects the application of a price-cap regulation mechanism to airports. Starkie, in contrast, is in favor of a dual-till price-cap regulation, [9] . He argues that, for non-capacity constrained airports, commercial airport activities should not be regulated because they could provide the airport with an incentive to reduce aeronautical charges. For capacity constrained airports, on the other hand, a dual-till regime would lead to higher aeronautical charges, which would have positive eects on the allocation of scarce slot capacity and on investment incentives. The reasoning is in line with the argument by Starkie and Yarrow [10] , and similar results are presented by Oum, Zhang, and Zhang [8] . The latter provide empirical evidence that a dual-till price-cap regulation improves economic eciency in terms of total factor productivity for large, busy airports compared to a single-till approach. Somewhat dierent are the conclusions of Lu and Pagliari [6] . According to them the single-till system is advantageous given that the market-clearing level of aeronautical charges is lower than the average cost of aeronautical services. This result is based on the assumption that aeronautical charges under a single-till context are lower than under a dual-till regulation, since under the latter prots from commercial activities are used to reduce aeronautical charges. Hence, if there exists excess capacity, capacity utilization is improved. On the other hand, for a capacity constrained airport, the use of capacity is improved under a dual-till regulation. Thus, according to Lu and Pagliari for capacity restricted airports the dual-till approach is assumed to be welfare enhancing.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the debate whether the singletill or the dual-till approach to price-cap regulation is appropriate. While the existing literature focuses on the eect of aeronautical charges on commercial airport activities, our model also takes into account the eects of commercial charges on the demand for aeronautical services. It is shown that the single-till approach dominates the dual-till approach. This result is based on the fact that the single-till system implements an optimal regulation of aeronautical charges.
However, it turns out that neither the dual-till nor the single-till regulation of the aeronautical charges is able to implement Ramsey charges. Since the demand for commercial goods is always a subset of the demand for aeronautical services, the Ramsey charge for the former is lower than that for the latter.
But this cannot be implemented by a regulation of aeronautical charges alone.
We nally show that it is possible to implement Ramsey prices by use of a weighted-average price-cap regulation scheme.
The next section presents the model. An unregulated monopolistic airport is considered in section 3. Section 4 analyzes Ramsey prices. The evaluation of single-till and dual-till price-cap regulation schemes follows in section 5. In section 6 an analysis of a perfect price-cap regulation approach is provided. The paper closes with some concluding remarks in section 7.
Model
The airport considered is a multi product monopolist which provides aeronautical and commercial services. The underlying assumption that airports possess market power in the markets for aeronautical and the commercial activities is in line with models used by other authors [8] , [11] .
The provision of airport services produces xed costs denominated by F ≥ 0.
For simplicity all variable airport costs are supposed to be zero. Furthermore, airlines and commercial service providers are assumed to be in perfect competition with constant marginal costs. Then we can express consumers' willingness to pay and the retail charges as net of the constant marginal costs. It follows that the airport charges are identical to the (net) retail charges for consumers.
There is a set of individuals denoted by Q with mass one. Everyone ies at most once and buys at most one unit of a commercial good. Letting p 1 ≥ 0 denote the charge for a ight and p 2 ≥ 0 the charge for commercial services, the utility of an individual q ∈ Q who ies and buys is
where V 1 (1) is the willingness to pay for a ight and V 2 (q) that for the commercial good. It is assumed that both V 1 (q) and V 2 (q) are uniformly and independently distributed over the unit interval, i.e. 
is satised.
For given charges p 1 and p 2 , the passenger demand D 1 and the demand for commercial airport services D 2 is illustrated in gure 1. We show that
For all individuals in the areas A and B the utility of a ight is at least as high as p 1 , hence, these individuals decide to y. Note that individuals located in area C also buy a ight although V 1 (q) ≤ p 1 . This is so because
and, hence, the negative rent from ying is compensated by the positive rent generated from consumption of commercial services. Only individuals located in the areas D and E do not buy a ight, since p 1 > V 1 (q) holds, and the rent generated by consumption is too small to compensate for the disutility resulting from ying. For p 1 + p 2 ≤ 1 one calculates:
Demand for commercial services is
For individuals located in the areas A and E the utility for consumption is smaller than p 2 , hence, they will not buy commercial services. Individuals located in area D do not consume aeronautical services simply because they do not y. For p 1 + p 2 ≤ 1:
Since all variable costs are assumed to be zero, the welfare W generated from ying and consuming is simply the sum of all actual buyers' willingness to pay for the two services:
For p 1 + p 2 ≤ 1:
With p 1 = p 2 = 0 welfare is at its maximum of 1.
3 An unregulated monopolistic airport
Which eect does the integration of commercial activities into the airports' optimization problem have on aeronautical charges? For an illustration, assume that p 2 = 1. Then nobody will demand airport commercial services, since V 2 (q) ≤ 1, and it follows that aeronautical demand is D 1 = 1−p 1 . Since marginal costs are zero, prot is maximized by p 1 = 0.5. Now assume to the contrary that p 1 = 0.
Then everyone buys a ight, the demand for commercial services is D 2 = 1 − p 2 , and the prot maximizing charge for commercial services is p 2 = 0.5. Now consider an airport which optimizes prots by simultaneous choice of aeronautical and commercial charges. Since both services are complementary we would expect one price to be reduced below 0.5, and the other to be raised above 0.5.
Which charge will be raised and which one reduced? The airports' maximization problem is given by:
with
(1) and (2) imply
The solution for (4) is given by (p
shows that a simultaneous prot maximization in fact raises the aeronautical charges and reduces the charges for commercial services. This is contrary to the hypothesis that an unregulated airport would reduce aeronautical charges in order to raise the protability of commercial activities [9] . 
The solution for (5) is plotted in gure 2 as a function of The rst order conditions for (5) for
It follows that p
Similar to the monopoly case, aeronautical Ramsey charges have to be higher than the commercial ones. The intuition is similar, too. Raising charges for aeronautical services is more protable than raising commercial charges.
It has been pointed out that cross-subsidization between commercial and aeronautical airport operations can be welfare enhancing [11] . However, our 1 In the following it is assumed that Π(p M
, p M
2 ) ≥ 0 is satised. Then Ramsey charges covering the xed costs exist. 
Single-till versus dual-till
We now address the comparison between single-till and dual-till price-cap regulation and their relation to Ramsey charges. Both approaches are characterized by the fact that only aeronautical charges are directly regulated, see [2] , [4] .
Hence, the regulator denes a price capp a ≥ 0 with a ∈ {s, d}, which restricts aeronautical charges to satisfy p 1 ≤p a . The indices denote the price-cap under a single-till (a = s) or a dual-till approach (a = d).
Single-till takes prots from aeronautical as well as commercial activities into account when determining the price-cap. The way of calculating a singletill price-cap is ideally given bȳ
Thus, the single-till price-cap is given by the maximum of zero and the average xed costs per passenger minus the average prots resulting from commercial activities per passenger. Rearranging (7) shows thatp s > 0 implies Π = 0. A dual-till price-cap is ideally given bȳ
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the xed costs which are attributable to aeronautical services. 2 The dual-till price-cap is given by the average xed costs attributable to aeronautical activities per passenger. Note, if the commercial
Our analysis of single-and dual-till regulation will be based on the assumptions that the above formulas are to be taken seriously, and that the regulator has a rational expectation of the airport's reaction to the price-cap. Formally, this amounts to a regulation game with two stages under perfect information.
In the rst stage the regulator determines the price-capp, satisfying either (7) or (8), and in the second stage the airport chooses charges (p 1 , p 2 ) so as to maximize prot subject to the price-cap and the non-negativity constraints.
Solving backwards, we obtain the airport's optimal strategy, or pair of reac- 
In the rst stage of the regulation game the airport setsp. For a single-till regulation,p s is the maximum of zero and the solution tō
For a dual-till regulation,p d is the solution tō
Note that the solutions for (9) and (10) are unique and that they constitute the unique subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium of the regulation game.
Under the single-till approach the Nash-equilibrium depends on F only, while under the dual-till approach it depends on F and α. The gures 3 and 4 show the charges implied by the Nash-equilibria with varying amounts of F respectively αF . Under dual-till regulation the airport is allowed to charge monopoly prices if αF 0.44 holds. Under the single-till approach monopoly prices are only
However, which regulation scheme should be preferred? The following proposition and corollary show that single-till regulation (weakly) dominates the dual-till regulation from a welfare perspective. Proposition 2 The welfare maximizing price-cap for the aeronautical charges, subject to a zero-prot condition, is equivalent to single-till regulation.
Proof The welfare maximizing regulation of airport charges is the solution to
At the solution it holds either Π(p 1 , p 2 ) = 0 orp = 0. Hence, the solution must be equivalent to the single-till price-cap.
Corollary 1 Single-till regulation strictly dominates dual-till regulation if
Proof The conditions imply thatp
To provide an intuition for proposition 2, one can calculate that ∂W (p, p 2 (p))/∂p ≤ 0 forp ≤ 2/3. Thus, in order to maximize welfare the regulator should try to implement the lowest possible price-cap for aeronautical charges, i.e., the one for which either Π = 0 orp = 0. However, this is the one also implemented by a single-till regulation. A particular advantage of the single-till approach in comparison to the dual-till follows from the fact that it allows complete control of the overall protability of the airport.
Note, however, that even the single-till approach cannot implement the Ramsey charges, since it regulates only the aeronautical charges. That is, we have
. For this reason, the following section proposes a perfect price-cap regulation scheme which will implement Ramsey charges.
A perfect price-cap regulation
To implement Ramsey charges the aeronautical as well as commercial charges have to be integrated into the price-cap formula. Suppose that airport charges are restricted by a capp on average prices with weights (w 1 , w 2 ) so as to satisfy
Then a price-capp and price-weights (w 1 , w 2 ) exist which guarantee that a prot maximizing airport will reproduce (p
Proposition 3 A price-cap of
for F <F in combination with price weights given by
Proof Assume F ≥F . Since W = W − Π + Π, the Lagrangean for the Ramsey problem (5) can be expressed as
Since W − Π is equivalent to an indirect utility function, rearranging the rst order condition for (12), after inserting ∂(W − Π)/∂p j = −D j given by Roy's identity, produces the following characterization of the Ramsey charges:
Consider now the optimization problem of a monopolistic airport subject to constraint (11) . The respective Lagrangean is
Rearranging the rst order condition for (14) generates
For
Hence, the conditions (13) and (15) are equivalent and therefore (p *
For F <F the Ramsey price for commercial services p the Ramsey solution will be reproduced for F <F .
Why do price weights w 1 = w 2 = 1 provide the airport with no incentives to set p 2 > 0? The intuition behind this result is, again, based on the complementarities between the demands for aeronautical and commercial services.
With equal price weights an increase of p 2 has to be compensated by a similar decrease of p 1 , due to the price-cap restriction. However, this would reduce prots.
Conclusions
Airport privatization has always been accompanied by some form of priceregulation. Our paper focuses on the current debate whether a price-cap regulation of monopolistic airports should take the form of a single-till or a dual-till regulation.
In order to address this issue we modelled the market interdependency between aeronautical and commercial airport activities and their impact on monopolistic airport charges. In particular, the demand for commercial services is always a subset of the demand for ights. We showed that this has an important implication: An unregulated monopolistic airport would tend to reduce charges for commercial services in order to raise the charges for ights.
Since rst-best charges would imply losses for a non-congested airport with low marginal costs we also considered Ramsey charges. It turned out that, consistently with monopolistic charges, Ramsey charges for aeronautical services are higher than the respective charges for commercial services. Our analysis shows that any cross-subsidization of aeronautical services by prots generated from commercial activities is only welfare enhancing if xed costs are fairly large.
Furthermore, we point out that the single-till dominates a dual-till regulation from a welfare point of view. This result is due to the fact that a singletill regulation is equivalent to an optimal price-cap regulation for aeronautical charges. However, even the single-till approach does not provide the monopolist with incentives to implement Ramsey charges. For a broad range of xed costs, the aeronautical charges implied by a single-till and a dual-till regulation are lower than the charges for commercial services. This strongly thwarts the idea of Ramsey charges. It is shown that Ramsey charges can be implemented by use of a weighted average price-cap regulation scheme.
